stag hunt example international relations
Those in favor of withdrawal are skeptical that a few thousand U.S. troops can make a decisive difference when 100,000 U.S. soldiers proved incapable of curbing the insurgency. Table 5. This democratic peace proposition not only challenges the validity of other political systems (i.e., fascism, communism, authoritarianism, totalitarianism), but also the prevailing realist account of international relations, which emphasises balance-of-power calculations and common strategic interests in order to explain the peace and stability that characterises relations between liberal democracies. Hunting stags is most beneficial for society but requires a . As stated before, achieving a scenario where both actors perceive to be in a Stag Hunt is the most desirable situation for maximizing safety from an AI catastrophe, since both actors are primed to cooperate and will maximize their benefits from doing so. As new technological developments bring us closer and closer to ASI[27] and the beneficial returns to AI become more tangible and lucrative, a race-like competition between key players to develop advanced AI will become acute with potentially severe consequences regarding safety. 0000001840 00000 n 695 0 obj As a result, there is no conflict between self-interest and mutual benefit, and the dominant strategy of both actors would be to defect. [52] In the context of developing an AI Coordination Regime, recognizing that two competing actors are in a state of Deadlock might drive peace-maximizing individuals to pursue de-escalation strategies that differ from other game models. Language links are at the top of the page across from the title. c 0000006962 00000 n This is visually represented in Table 4 with each actors preference order explicitly outlined. Weiss and Agassi wrote about this argument: "This we deem somewhat incorrect since it is an oversight of the agreement that may change the mutual expectations of players that the result of the game depends on Aumanns assertion that there is no a priori reason to expect agreement to lead to cooperation requires completion; at times, but only at times, there is a posteriori reason for that How a given player will behave in a given game, thus, depends on the culture within which the game takes place".[8]. See Carl Shulman, Arms Control and Intelligence Explosions, 7th European Conference on Computing and Philosophy, Bellaterra, Spain, July 24, 2009: 6. For Rousseau, in his famous parable of the stag hunt, war is inevitable because of the security dilemma and the lack of trust between states. But, after nearly two decades of participation in the countrys fledgling democratic politics, economic reconstruction and security-sector development, many of these strongmen have grown invested in the Afghan states survival and the dividends that they hope will come with greater peace and stability. Dipali Mukhopadhyay is an associate professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University and the author of Warlords, Strongman Governors, and the State in Afghanistan (Cambridge University Press, 2014). The prototypical example of a PGG is captured by the so-called NPD. If, by contrast, each hunter patiently keeps his or her post, everyone will be rewarded with a lavish feast. Interestingly enough, the Stag Hunt theory can be used to describe social contracts within society, with the contract being the one to hunt the stag or achieve mutual benefit. If the regime allows for multilateral development, for example, the actors might agree that whoever reaches AI first receives 60% of the benefit, while the other actor receives 40% of the benefit. In game theory, the stag hunt, sometimes referred to as the assurance game, trust dilemma or common interest game, describes a conflict between safety and social cooperation. As the infighting continues, the impulse to forego the elusive stag in favor of the rabbits on offer will grow stronger by the day. the primary actors in war, having been replaced by "group[s] identified in terms of ethnicity, religion, or tribe" and that such forces rarely fight each other in a decisive encounter. Payoff variables for simulated Prisoners Dilemma. The remainder of this subsection looks at numerical simulations that result in each of the four models and discusses potential real-world hypotheticals these simulations might reflect. Formally, a stag hunt is a game with two pure strategy Nash equilibriaone that is risk dominant and another that is payoff dominant. This same dynamic could hold true in the development of an AI Coordination Regime, where actors can decide whether to abide by the Coordination Regime or find a way to cheat. Uses of Game Theory in International Relations While there is certainly theoretical value in creating a single model that can account for all factors and answer all questions inherent to the AI Coordination Problem, this is likely not tractable or useful to attempt at least with human hands and minds alone. [58] Downs et al., Arms Races and Cooperation, 143-144. At key moments, the cooperation among Afghan politicians has been maintained with a persuasive nudge from U.S. diplomats. In international relations terms, the states exist in anarchy. As a result, it is important to consider deadlock as a potential model that might explain the landscape of AI coordination. Both actors are more optimistic in Actor Bs chances of developing a beneficial AI, but also agree that entering an AI Coordination Regime would result in the highest chances of a beneficial AI. Photo Credit: NATO photo by Capt. But what is even more interesting (even despairing) is, when the situation is more localized and with a smaller network of acquainted people, most players still choose to hunt the hare as opposed to working together to hunt the stag. In times of stress, individual unicellular protists will aggregate to form one large body. @scR^}C$I3v95p6S'34Y1rar{SQ!#fzHBM6 K4m|OOpa7rB'~Y(A|'vh=ziN/quu~6,{Q Before getting to the theory, I will briefly examine the literature on military technology/arms racing and cooperation. [31] Executive Office of the President National Science and Technology Council: Committee on Technology, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence, Executive Office of the President of the United States (October 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf; Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and the Economy Executive Office of the President of the United States (December 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Artificial-Intelligence-Automation-Economy.PDF. If participation is not universal, they cannot surround the stag and it escapes, leaving everyone that hunted stag hungry. The United States is in the hunt, too. One example payoff structure that results in a Chicken game is outlined in Table 11. To what extent does today's mainstream media provide us with an objective view of war? endstream endobj 1 0 obj <> endobj 2 0 obj [/PDF/Text] endobj 3 0 obj <> endobj 8 0 obj <> endobj 9 0 obj <>stream As a result of this, security-seeking actions such as increasing technical capacity (even if this is not explicitly offensive this is particularly relevant to wide-encompassing capacity of AI) can be perceived as threatening and met with exacerbated race dynamics.